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Abstract
RYAN T. BALL: Does Anticipated Information Impose
a Cost on Risk-Averse Investors?.
(Under the direction of Robert M. Bushman and Eric Ghysels.)
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price
changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk-averse investors’ trad-
ing decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. Specifically, I examine how trading
volume is influenced by the trade-off between risk-sharing benefits of immediate trade to miti-
gate exposure to future adverse price changes, and explicit transaction costs imposed on such
trades. Employing a stylized model, I demonstrate that current trading decisions depend upon
two aspects of risk: the expected intensity of future price fluctuations per unit of time, and
the duration of time that risk must be borne. Tension in the model is created by introducing
an incremental capital gains tax rate applied to trading profits on shares held for less than a
requisite amount of time. Thus, risk-averse investors face an economic tension between trading
immediately to an optimal risk-sharing portfolio at the cost of incurring an incremental tax on
realized trading profits, versus postponing trade to avoid the incremental tax while facing the
risk of interim, adverse price changes. The fact that investors can reduce tax costs by post-
poning the sale of shares until a known, future point in time creates a unique opportunity to
empirically investigate the impact of the duration of risk on trading behavior. Consistent with
the model’s predictions, I document that as the number of days left to avoid the incremental
tax increases (i.e., duration of risk increases), trading volume around quarterly earnings an-
nouncements is less sensitive to the incremental tax on short-term trading profits. Similarly, as
the expected volatility of future stock price increases (i.e., intensity increases), current trading
volume is again less sensitive to incremental tax costs. These results suggest that investors are
more willing to incur explicit tax costs in order to insulate themselves against increases in the
risk of price fluctuations driven by increases in the duration or intensity of risk.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In efficient capital markets, stock prices adjust to reflect the arrival of new information, which
leads to stock price volatility (e.g., Beaver, 1968; Fama, 1970; Fama, 1991). Expected price
volatility deriving from the anticipated arrival of information imposes an implicit cost upon
undiversified, risk-averse investors by virtue of their exposure to the risk of adverse price changes
(Hirshleifer, 1971; Verrecchia, 1982).1 In response, risk-averse investors generally desire to trade
shares prior to the arrival of information in order to spread the economy’s aggregate risk while
diversifying their idiosyncratic risks.2 In an idealized, perfect capital market with frictionless
trading, investors can quickly and efficiently balance their portfolios to insure themselves against
adverse price changes in the future. However, the existence of costly trading frictions can
constrain investors from trading to their desired portfolios, leaving them exposed to implicit
costs associated with the risk of adverse price changes from the arrival of new information.
In this paper, I theoretically and empirically investigate how trading behavior in institu-
tionally imperfect capital markets is explicitly influenced by the risk of future adverse price
changes. In particular, I examine the relationship between trading volume and the risk of ad-
verse price changes in the presence of trading frictions created by the existence of intertemporal
tax discontinuities (hereafter ITDs). An ITD results from the incremental capital gains tax
1Ceteris paribus, anticipated price volatility is increasing in the precision of the anticipated information.
2A prominent theoretical model of optimal risk sharing in financial markets is the Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). In the CAPM, risk-averse investors seek to minimize their
exposure to the risk of adverse price changes by holding a diversified portfolio consistent with their individual
preferences for risk.
rate applied to trading profits on shares held for less than a requisite amount of time.3 In order
to qualify for the lower long-term capital gains tax, investors are required to hold assets for
a requisite amount of time (typically 12 months) before selling them, or else incur the higher
short-term capital gains tax on trading profits. Given an ITD, risk averse investors face an
economic tension between trading immediately to an optimal risk-sharing portfolio at the cost
of incurring an incremental tax on realized trading profits, versus postponing trade to avoid
the incremental tax while facing the risk of interim, adverse price changes. This tension is the
focus of this paper.
I begin by developing a theoretical framework that employs a two-period model where risk-
averse investors are endowed with a desire to trade for risk-sharing purposes. At date 1, where
an ITD cost prevails, investors are presented with an opportunity to trade. Investors can avoid
paying the ITD cost by postponing some of their desired trade until date 2 when they will
have held shares sufficiently long enough to avoid paying the incremental ITD cost. However,
by delaying trade, they do not achieve their optimal risk-sharing portfolio at date 1. In the
interim, investors are exposed to the risk of adverse price changes due to the anticipated arrival
of new information signals.4 I find that period 1 trading volume is decreasing in the magnitude
of the aggregate ITD cost among all investors, and increasing in the precision of the anticipated
information.5
The model yields empirical implications concerning how the negative relationship between
volume and ITD costs vary with the risk of future price changes. As just discussed, ceteris
paribus, trading volume is decreasing in aggregate ITD costs among investors. However, in
3Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) coin the term intertemporal tax discontinuity and define it as “a circum-
stance in which different tax rates are applied to gains realized at one point in time versus some other point in
time” (pg. 205). In the context of my study, an ITD specifically refers to the difference in tax rates applied to
long-term versus short-term capital gains.
4In the model, the risk of adverse price changes between the first and second rounds of trading is driven by the
precision of the anticipated information signals. In essence, signals of high precision resolve a lot of uncertainty,
which (from the ex-ante perspective of period 1) increases the risk of adverse price movements for an investor
holding a sub-optimal risk-sharing portfolio. If no signals are released in the interim, there is no risk of adverse
price changes and no tension exists as all investors wait to trade until the low tax rate is operative at date 2.
5That is, the risk of future adverse price changes increases in the precision of anticipated future signals, as
high precision signals will cause the future price to be very sensitive to these signals, exposing risk-averse traders
to the possibility of large price drops.
2
making their trading decision, individual investors are also concerned about the risk of adverse
price changes while waiting to qualify for the lower tax rate. I demonstrate that as the precision
of the anticipated information signals increases, which increases price volatility and the risk of
future adverse price changes, investors place less weight on ITD incentives in making their
current trading decisions. Consistent with the model, I empirically document that as price
volatility increases, traders become more willing to incur the ITD cost involved with trading
before satisfying the requisite ITD holding period in order to trade closer to their optimal
risk-sharing portfolio and insulate themselves against anticipated price volatility.
Specifically, I find that the total amount of risk each investor considers is an increasing
function of both the intensity and the duration of the risk of adverse price changes. Intuitively,
intensity captures the risk of adverse price movements per unit of time, while duration captures
the amount of time that such risk must be held. For example, a trader may have only a few
days left in the requisite ITD holding period, but the risk of adverse price movement is very
intense during the short remaining interval, creating incentives for the investor to trade now
towards an optimal portfolio to avoid adverse price movements. Likewise, even if intensity is
low, an investor with a long duration until qualifying for the favorable long-term tax rate can
still have strong incentives to trade today because the low intensity risk must be held over a
long time period.
First, I empirically examine the impact of the duration component of risk on trading vol-
ume around quarterly earnings announcements. Employing a MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS)
regression, I test whether the duration component of risk affects investors’ trading responses
to ITD costs. The MIDAS technique involves regressing low frequency data (e.g., quarterly
observations) on high frequency data (e.g., daily observations). Instead of including just one
aggregate ITD cost variable, I am able to include a different ITD cost for each holding period
relative to qualification for the lower tax rate. This allows me to test if the sensitivity of trading
volume to ITD costs decreases as the number of days to qualification increases (i.e., duration
increases). I provide evidence consistent with this prediction. Second, using the average daily
stock return volatility as a proxy for the intensity of risk, I find evidence that the sensitivity
of trading volume to ITD costs decreases as the risk of adverse price changes per unit of time
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increases (i.e., intensity increases). In other words, the higher the anticipated price volatility,
the less influential ITD incentives are on current trading decisions as investors become more
willing to trade now to hedge the more intense risk, despite incurring higher tax costs.
A number of institutional constraints exist that may inhibit investors’ ability to opti-
mally make trades. These include incomplete capital markets (Merton, 1987), short sale con-
straints/prohibitions (Diamond and Verrecchia, 1987), bid/ask spreads (Constantinides, 1986),
and taxes (Shackelford and Verrecchia, 2002). While each of these transaction costs is poten-
tially important, I choose to examine the trading friction created by the incremental ITD tax
because it offers several important advantages over other transaction costs.
First, and most importantly, an ITD is a time-varying transaction cost with a finite amount
of time until expiration, which is perfectly anticipated by investors. In order to qualify for
the lower long-term capital gains tax rate, investors are required to hold assets for a requisite
amount of time.6 This is crucial for my empirical tests because it allows me to measure the time
horizon over which investors will consider the risk of adverse price changes when considering
how many shares to trade in order to avoid paying an ITD transaction cost. In contrast,
most other transaction costs, such as bid-ask spreads and long-term capital gains taxes, do not
have an anticipated time variation that allow investors to optimally avoid them.7 For example,
investors can avoid paying long-term capital gains taxes by postponing the sale of their portfolio
until death. However, investors’ expectations over their life expectancy is unobservable.
Second, an ITD represents a potentially significant trading cost to investors. Currently, the
maximum ITD cost imposed on investors, equal to the difference in the maximum statutory
capital gains tax rates applied to short-term and long-term gains, is 20%, but has historically
been as low as 0% (1988 – 1990) and as high as 30% (1982 – 1986). However, the actual ITD
cost that investors consider may differ for a number of reasons. First, some investors may
have held shares for the requisite amount of time and qualified for the lower long-term capital
6Historically, the requisite holding period has been 6, 9, 12, and 18 months. The ITD holding period of 12
months is the most common.
7While the magnitude of bid-ask spreads and long-term capital gain tax rates can change over time, the
change is not fully anticipated (except in unusual circumstances) and thus does not provide investors with an
incentive known in advance of the event.
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gains tax rate. These investors have no ITD incentive to postpone trading. Second, a portion
of any short-term capital gains accrued in one security may be partially offset by short-term
capital losses from another security in an investor’s portfolio, leading to a lower ITD incentive
to postpone trades. Third, some investors, such as institutions, may be tax-exempt.8 All of
these effects imply that ITD may not be important to investors and may work against finding
empirical results.
Finally, recent empirical evidence supports an important role for ITD costs in shaping
investor demand and trading volume. For example, Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003)
and Hurtt and Seida (2004) find a negative and statistically significant association between
ITD costs and trading volume following quarterly earnings announcements. Reese (1998) finds
similar evidence using a sample of IPO firms. However, none of these studies considers how
anticipated information influences this negative relationship which is the central focus of my
paper.
Examining how trading decisions are influenced by the trade-off between implicit risk costs
and explicit ITD costs contributes to at least two distinct strands of literature. First, it con-
tributes to a large body of literature, dating back at least to Hirshleifer (1971), that theoretically
examines the welfare implications of anticipated information. Hirshleifer (1971) demonstrates
that in a pure exchange economy, risk-averse investors are collectively made worse off (in ex-
pectation) if they are not allowed to contract (or trade) prior to the release of anticipated
information. Trading spreads investors’ risks across the economy and protects investors against
the risk that the anticipated information will adversely change prices. Verrecchia (2001) refers
to this as the adverse risk-sharing effect of increased disclosure.9 My analysis provides a novel
and powerful setting in which to directly examine the empirical implications of the adverse
risk-sharing effect of anticipated information.
Second, this study contributes to a large body of tax-related literature that examines if
8See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) and Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) for a comprehensive review
of why capital gain taxes may not matter to investors.
9Subsequent studies formalize Hirshleifer’s argument (e.g., Marshall, 1974; Hakansson, Kunkel and Ohlson,
1982) and develop theoretical models that examine the welfare role of anticipated information using alternative
assumptions and settings. See Verrecchia (1982), Diamond (1985), Bushman (1991), Alles and Lundholm (1993),
and Campbell (2004), among others. Verrecchia (2001; Section 4) provides an extensive review of this literature.
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capital markets are influenced by shareholder taxes.10 Specifically, it provides discriminating
predictions, based on the risk of adverse price changes, about whether investors’ trading deci-
sions are influenced by shareholder capital gain taxes. Maydew (2001) describes the need for
tax-related predictions related to economic trade-offs by posing the following question: if chick-
ens cross the road “because taxes are lower on the other side. . . why did not all the chickens
cross the road?” My study argues that some chickens may choose not to cross the road to the
lower tax side (i.e., wait until qualifying for the lower long-term tax rate) because the road is
too wide (i.e., high duration), too heavily traveled (i.e., high intensity), or both, making it too
risky to cross to the other side.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the theoretical framework
and empirical implications. Chapter 3 describes the empirical sample and variable definitions.
Chapter 4 presents the empirical analysis and results. Chapter 5 concludes.
10See Shackelford and Shevlin (2001) for a comprehensive review of this literature.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Assumptions
The following analysis employs a model of pure exchange populated by a countably infinite
number of risk-averse investors with homogenous risk preferences. There are four discrete time
periods, referred to as periods 0, 1, 2, and 3. Investors are endowed with shares of a risky asset
and a risk-free bond in period 0, trade shares of both in periods 1 and 2, and consume wealth in
period 3. One share of the bond (the numeraire commodity) pays one unit of consumption in
period 3, while the payoff from a share of the risky asset is a random variable, u˜. The per-capita
supply of the risky asset, x, is common knowledge among investors and remains fixed across all
time periods.
In period 0, there are three distinct groups of investors, indexed by i ∈ {B,S1, S2} ≡
{Buyers, Sellers1, Sellers2}, that differ only in their risk-free bond endowment, Ei, risky
asset endowment, D0,i, and basis, P0,i. Specifically, Buyers are endowed with a sufficiently
“underweighted” amount of the risky asset (i.e., D0,B < x), and therefore wish to buy ad-
ditional shares. Conversely, Sellers1 and Sellers2, with equal endowments, are sufficiently
“overweighted” (i.e., D0,S1 = D0,S2 > x), and therefore wish to sell a portion of their risky
asset portfolio.1 In addition, each investor i is endowed with a basis, P0,i ∈ {P0,B, P0,S1 , P0,S2},
1The assumption that investors hold less than an optimal risk sharing amount is made to generate trading
volume that triggers capital gains taxes. In this model, there are two situations in which no trade results.
First, investors will not trade if they are endowed with an optimal risk-sharing amount of the risky asset, x
(Milgrom and Stokey, 1982). Second, even if investors are given sub-optimal risk-sharing endowments, they may
used to compute capital gains. Finally, let θδ, θ (1− δ), and (1− θ) represent the relative pro-
portions of Sellers1, Sellers2, and Buyers in the economy, respectively, which is fixed across
time. Therefore, in every period t, per-capita demand for the risky asset must equal per-capita
supply: θ [δDt,S1 + (1− δ)Dt,S2 ] + (1− θ)Dt,B = x. This identity implies that the aggregate
change in demand across any number of time periods, r, is equal to zero:
θ [δ (Dt,S1 −Dt−r,S1) + (1− δ) (Dt,S2 −Dt−r,S2)] + (1− θ) (Dt,B −Dt−r,B) = 0, (2.1)
where Dt,i is investor i’s demand for the risky asset in period t.
In period 1, all traders observe an earnings announcement about the value of the risky
asset. Conditional upon this announcement, investors’ expectations about u˜ are that it has
a normal distribution with a mean of u¯ and a precision (inverse of variance) of h.2 After
observing the earnings announcement, investors trade shares of the risky asset and risk-free
bond at competitive prices.
Investors’ period 1 demand functions are driven by two opposing forces. First, following
Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002), I assume periods 0 and 1 are sufficiently close in time so that
any trading profits from the sale of assets in period 1 are taxed at an unfavorable short-term
capital gains tax rate, τ . Investors can reduce their taxes by postponing their trading activity
until period 2, when a second round of trade opens. I assume period 2 is sufficiently distant
in time from period 1 so that any realized trading profits in this period qualify for a favorable
long-term capital gains tax, which is normalized to zero. Therefore, τ represents the spread
between the short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates and captures the incremental
incentive created by an ITD to postpone trading until period 2.
not trade if their initial allocations are sufficiently close to optimal risk sharing such that the marginal ITD cost
is higher than the marginal risk-sharing benefit of trading the first share. I avoid this uninteresting scenario,
by assuming that investors are ‘sufficiently’ overweighted and underweighted in the risky asset. Therefore, my
model is intended to shed light on how anticipated information incrementally influences trading volume, given a
desire to trade, and is not intended to explain why trading volume exists.
2Following Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) I interpret this assumption as the earnings announcement
subsuming all investors’ prior information about u¯. That is, any prior information is a forecast of the earnings
announcement, which the actual earnings announcement in period 1 subsumes (for example, see Abarbanell,
Lanen and Verrecchia, 1995).
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Second, between periods 1 and 2, investors observe N anticipated public signals, y˜n = u˜+ ε˜n
indexed by n ∈ (1, .., N), where ε˜n is independently and normally distributed with mean 0 and
precision s. The total information contained in these signals creates an incentive for investors
to trade in period 1 to protect themselves from adverse price changes in period 2.
The model concludes in period 3 when investors realize the payoff of the risky asset, pay any
capital gains taxes, and consume their remaining wealth. Investors are risk averse with a utility
for wealth characterized by the negative exponential utility function, U(W˜i) = − exp(−W˜i/γ),
where γ is a risk tolerance parameter common to all investors. W˜i is investor i’s final wealth
that is equal to:
W˜i = Ei + P0,iD0,i + (P1 − P0,i) (D0,i −D1,i) + (P2 − P0,i) (D1,i −D2,i)
+ (u˜− P0,i)D2,i − τi (P1 − P0,i) (D0,i −D1,i) , (2.2)
where P1 and P2 are the prices of the risky asset and D1,i and D2,i are investor i’s demand for
the risky asset in periods 1 and 2, respectively. The final term in (2.2) reflects the total amount
of capital gains taxes paid by investor i on trading profits in period 1.
2.2 Model Equilibrium
The equilibrium price and demand functions in periods 1 and 2 are solved using backward
induction. In period 2, trader imaximizes his expected utility with respect to his demand for the
risky asset, D2,i, conditional upon observing the earnings announcement and theN intermediate
public signals. Because investor i’s period 1 tax, τi, does not affect this optimization problem,
it is straightforward to solve for the equilibrium in period 2:
P˜2 = E [u˜|y˜1, ..., y˜N ]− x
γ
V ar [u˜|y˜1, ..., y˜N ]
=
hu¯+ s
∑N
n=1 y˜n
h+Ns
− x
γ (h+Ns)
, (2.3)
D2,i = x, ∀i. (2.4)
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Equations (2.3) and (2.4) are a standard result for a model of this type in which all information is
public and investors have homogenous risk preferences (e.g., Verrecchia, 1982). Each investor,
regardless of type, holds a share of the risky asset equal to the per-capita supply, x. This
demonstrates that even in the presence of an ITD , investors do eventually achieve an optimal
risk sharing portfolio prior to the realization of the risky asset payoff. In contrast, investors in
the one-period ITD model of Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) never reach such an optimal
risk sharing portfolio.
In period 1, trader i chooses his demand, D1,i, which maximizes his expected utility given
(2.3) and (2.4), while anticipating the release of N public signals before period 2. As derived in
Appendix A, the equilibrium price and demand functions are described in the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. In the presence of an ITD, the (unique) period 1 equilibrium following a “good
news” earnings announcement (i.e., P1 > P0,i, ∀i) is one in which Buyers (Sellers) always buy
(sell) shares of the risky asset. That is,
P1 =
u¯− xγh − θτP¯0
(1− θτ) , (2.5)
D1,S1 = x+
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
τ (1− θ)
[
u¯− xγh − (1−θτ)(1−θ) P0,S1 − τP¯0
]
(1− θτ) ≤ D0,S1 , (2.6)
D1,S2 = x+
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
τ (1− θ)
[
u¯− xγh − (1−θτ)(1−θ) P0,S2 − τP¯0
]
(1− θτ) ≤ D0,S2 , (2.7)
D1,B = x−
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
θτ
[
u¯− xγh − P¯0
]
(1− θτ) ≤ x, (2.8)
where P¯0 = δP0,S1 + (1− δ)P0,S2 is the average tax basis among investors selling shares of the
risky asset.
Proof. Consider the period 1 problem of an investor of type i, subject to a tax rate τi:
Max
D1,i
Eu˜,P˜2
[
− exp
(
−W˜i/γ
)]
,
where W˜i is given by equation 2.2. Substituting the relation D2,i = x (from equation 2.4) and
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omitting terms unrelated to D1,i, P˜2, or u˜, the objective function simplifies to:
Eu˜,P˜2
[
− exp
{
− 1γ
[
P˜2 − P1 (1− τi)− P0,iτi
]
D1,i − 1γ (u˜− P˜2,i)x
}]
.
Using the moment-generating function of the normal random variable, P˜2, and dropping the
term (1/γ)(u˜ − P˜2,i)x because it is unrelated to the choice variable, D1,i, investor i’s problem
becomes:
Max
D1,i
− exp
{
− 1γ
[
E[P˜2]− P1 (1− τi)− P0,iτi
]
D1,i + 1γ2D
2
1,iV ar[P˜2]
}
.
Differentiating this expression with respect to D1,i, setting it equal to zero, and solving for D1,i
yields:
D1,i =
[
E[P˜2]− P1 (1− τi)− P0,iτi
]
1
γV ar[P˜2]
.
At this point, there are two potential equilibria in period 1: (1) Sellers dispose of shares and
Buyers acquire shares (i.e., all investors trade toward optimal risk-sharing) and (2) Sellers
acquire shares and Buyers dispose of shares (i.e., all investors trade away from optimal risk-
sharing).
Consider the first potential equilibrium. If Sellers sell shares in period 1, then they will incur
a tax, τS1 = τS2 = τ , on any trading profits. Conversely, Buyers will not pay taxes, τB = 0, on
any shares they purchase in period 1. Consequently, the demand functions of Buyers, Sellers1,
and Sellers2 can be expressed, respectively, as
D1,B =
[
E[P˜2]− P1
]
1
γV ar[P˜2]
, (2.9)
D1,S1 =
[
E[P˜2]− P1 (1− τ)− P0,S1τ
]
1
γV ar[P˜2]
, (2.10)
D1,S2 =
[
E[P˜2]− P1 (1− τ)− P0,S2τ
]
1
γV ar[P˜2]
. (2.11)
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Applying the market clearing condition and substituting (2.9)–(2.11):
x =
∫
D1,idi
= θ [δ ·D1,S1 + (1− δ) ·D1,S2 ] + (1− θ)D1,B
=
E[P˜2]− P1 [(1− τ)θ + (1− θ)]− θτ [δP0,S1 + (1− δ)P0,S2 ]
1
γV ar[P˜2]
=
E[P˜2]− P1(1− θτ)− θτP¯0
1
γV ar[P˜2]
where P¯0 = δP0,S1+(1− δ)P0,S2 . The unconditional expectation and variance of P˜2, from (2.3)
is given by:
E[P˜2] = u¯− xγ(h+Ns) , (2.12)
V ar[P˜2] =
Ns
h (h+Ns)
. (2.13)
Substituting (2.12) and (2.13) into the market clearing condition and solving for P1 yields:
P1 =
E[P˜2]− xγV ar[P˜2]− θτP¯0
1− θτ
=
u¯− xγ(h+Ns) − xNsγh(h+Ns) − θτP¯0
1− θτ
=
u¯− xγh − θτP¯0
1− θτ , (2.14)
which is identical to (2.5). Substituting (2.12)–(2.14) into (2.9)–(2.11) and simplifying each
expression gives:
D1,S1 = x+
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
τ (1− θ)
[
u¯− xγh − (1−θτ)(1−θ) P0,S1 − τP¯0
]
(1− θτ) (2.15)
D1,S2 = x+
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
τ (1− θ)
[
u¯− xγh − (1−θτ)(1−θ) P0,S2 − τP¯0
]
(1− θτ) (2.16)
D1,B = x−
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
θτ
[
u¯− xγh − P¯0
]
(1− θτ) (2.17)
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which are identical to (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8), respectively.
Note that Buyers demand function, given by (2.17), can be rewritten as follows:
D1,B = x−
γh
(
1 + hNs
)
θτ
[
u¯− xγh − P¯0
]
(1− θτ)
= x− θτ(P1 − P¯0)
1
γV ar[P˜2]
. (2.18)
Recall that a “good news” announcement assumes P1 > P0,i, ∀i, which means that P1 must
be greater than the average P0,i (i.e., P1 > P¯0). It directly follows from (2.18) that Buyers
demand, D1,B, must be less than the optimal risk-sharing allocation, x. Therefore, if Buyers
purchase shares, they buy less than an optimal risk-sharing amount. Similar manipulations of
(2.15) and (2.16) lead to the result that Sellers period 1 demand is always greater than the
optimal risk-sharing amount, x.
Next, consider the second potential equilibrium where Sellers acquire shares and Buyers
dispose of shares (i.e., all investors trade away from optimal risk-sharing). If Sellers buy shares
in period 1, then they do not incur a tax, τS1 = τS2 = 0, on any trading profits. Conversely,
Buyers do pay taxes, τB = τ , on the sale of shares in period 1. In this scenario, Buyers and
Sellers swap their tax status and, therefore, swap their demand functions. Therefore, Buyers
take on the demand function of Sellers derived in the first equilibrium, which implies that they
desire to hold an amount greater than the optimal risk-sharing amount, x. Given that Buyers,
by definition, initially hold an “underweighted” amount, D0,B < x, the only way they can trade
to an amount greater than x is to purchase additional shares. This is inconsistent with the
initial conjecture that Buyers sell shares and demonstrates that the second equilibrium does
not exist. Therefore, the unique period 1 equilibrium is one in which Buyers (Sellers) always
buy (sell) shares of the risky asset (i.e., D1,B ≥ D0,B, D1,S1 ≤ D0,S1 , and D1,S2 ≤ D0,S2).
Equation (2.5) illustrates that the presence of the ITD increases stock price as Sellers
demand compensation for incurring the incremental tax in period 1.3 In equilibrium, the price
3The situation where Sellers demand compensation from Buyers for the capital gain taxes paid on trades is
commonly referred to as the “lock-in” effect (e.g., Landsman and Shackelford, 1995; Klein, 1999; Jin, 2006; Dai
et al., 2008).
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reflects the average tax rate, θτ , among all investors as the total tax cost in the economy
is redistributed across all investors. Therefore, while Buyers are not explicitly taxed on the
purchase of shares in period 1, they are implicity taxed through an increase in the price of
the risky asset. Surprisingly, equation (2.5) does not depend upon any characteristics of the
anticipated public signals (i.e., N and s). In fact, this result is identical to the price derived
in the one-period model of Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002), which does not allow a role for
intermediate public signals.
In contrast to price, the individual demand functions in (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8) depend
upon N and s as well as the average ITD, θτ , among all investors. In equilibrium, investors’
optimal demand falls somewhere in between their initial endowment, D0,i and their optimal
risk sharing allocation, x. How closely each investor trades to x depends upon the relative costs
from anticipated signal characteristics (i.e., N and s), compared to the explicit and implicit
ITD costs.
At one extreme, when the anticipated signals provide no additional information (i.e., N → 0
or s→ 0), investors know exactly what the price in period 2 will be since there will be no new
information to update their beliefs about the underlying value of the risky asset. Consequently,
investors will not trade away from their endowment position, D0,i, because they can avoid
paying the ITD without any risk of adverse price changes.
At the other extreme, when the anticipated signals are expected to fully reveal the payoff
of the risky asset (i.e., N → ∞ or s → ∞), investors trade as close as possible to the optimal
risk sharing allocation, x. By allowing N or s to go to ∞, my model effectively collapses to the
one-period model of Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) and (2.6), (2.7), and (2.8) are identical
to the demand functions derived in that paper’s model.
The intention of the model developed in Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002) is to examine
how the existence of an ITD influences price and trading volume, holding the precision of the
anticipated information environment constant at ∞. In contrast, the intention of my model is
to examine how changing the precision of the anticipated information environment influences
price and trading volume when an ITD is present.
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2.3 Period 1 Trading Volume
The results from Lemma 1 highlight how anticipated public signals influence individual demand,
but not price, when ITDs are present. Thus, the key construct underlying my model’s empir-
ical predictions is the function describing the period 1 trading volume following the earnings
announcement. By definition, the per-capita trading volume in period 1 is equal to
V1 = 12
∫
|D1,i −D0,i| di
= 12θ [δ |D1,S1 −D0,S1 |+ (1− δ) |D1,S2 −D0,S2 |]
+12 (1− θ) |D1,B −D0,B|
= 12θ [δ (D0,S1 −D1,S1) + (1− δ) (D0,S2 −D1,S2)]
+12 (1− θ) (D1,B −D0,B) , (2.19)
where the last step follows from Lemma 1, which states that Buyers always buy (D0,B ≤ D1,B)
and Sellers always sell (D0,S1 ≥ D1,S1 and D0,S2 ≥ D1,S2). Substituting (2.1) into (2.19),
per-capita trading volume is expressed in terms of Buyers demand:
V1 = (1− θ) (D1,B −D0,B) . (2.20)
Finally, substituting the period 1 demand function of Buyers from (2.8) into (2.20) leads to
the following proposition, which illustrates how trading volume is influenced by the interaction
between anticipated information and ITDs:
Proposition 1. In the presence of an ITD, per-capita trading volume following a “good news”
earnings announcement (i.e., P1 > P0,i, ∀i) is
V1 = V ∗ − (1− θ)
ITD incentive to
postpone trade︷ ︸︸ ︷
θτ∆¯P1
1
γV ar
[
P˜2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk incentive to
trade immediately
, (2.21)
where V ∗ = (1− θ) (x−D0,B) is the optimal trading volume, V ar[P˜2] = Nsh(h+Ns) is the variance
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of period 2 price, and ∆¯P1 = P1 − δP0,S1 − (1− δ)P0,S2 is the average trading profit among
Sellers.
Proof. Substituting (2.18) into (2.20) and simplifying the expression gives:
V1 = (1− θ) (D1,B −D0,B)
= (1− θ)
(
x−D0,B − θτ(P1 − P¯0)1
γV ar[P˜2]
)
= V ∗ − (1− θ) θτ∆¯P1
1
γV ar[P˜2]
where V ∗ = (1− θ)(x−D0,B), V ar[P˜2] = Nsh(h+Ns , and ∆¯P1 = P1 − δP0,S1 − (1− δ)P0,S2 .
Equation (2.21) illustrates the key tension of the model. Actual trading volume, V1, is less
than optimal risk sharing volume, V ∗, by an amount proportional to the ratio of the aggregate
ITD cost to the risk of an adverse price change in period 2. Specifically, as the ITD cost of
trading in period 1 increases, investors trade less because the implicit cost from bearing the
risk of adverse price changes becomes relatively lower than the increasing ITD cost. That is:
Corollary 1. Following a “good news” earnings announcement (i.e., P1 > P0,i, ∀i), per-capita
trading volume is (weakly) decreasing in the ITD incentive to postpone trading among all in-
vestors,
∂V1
∂ (ITD)
= − (1− θ)
1
γV ar[P˜2]
≤ 0,
where ITD = θτ∆¯P1.
Corollary 1 is the main result derived in Shackelford and Verrecchia (2002), but represents
a point of departure for the implications of my model. Equation (2.21) also demonstrates that
trading volume increases as the risk incentive to trade increases. This leads to the following:
Corollary 2. Following a “good news” earnings announcement (i.e., P1 > P0,i, ∀i), the negative
relationship between per-capita trading volume and the ITD incentive among all investors is
(weakly) increasing (i.e., becoming less negative) in both the intensity, s, and the duration, N ,
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of anticipated information:
∂2V1
∂ (ITD) ∂N
=
∂2V1
∂ (ITD) ∂V ar[P˜2]
∂V ar[P˜2]
∂N
= (+) (+) ≥ 0, (2.22)
∂2V1
∂ (ITD) ∂s
=
∂2V1
∂ (ITD) ∂V ar[P˜2]
∂V ar[P˜2]
∂s
= (+) (+) ≥ 0. (2.23)
However, before proceeding, it is important to note that optimal trading volume, V ∗, in
equation (2.21) is a constant that represents the average difference between investors’ endow-
ment and the optimal risk sharing allocation, x. If the average ITD, θτ , among investors in the
risky asset is equal to zero, then trading volume in period 1, V1, will equal a constant, V ∗, as
investors trade without cost to an optimal risk sharing portfolio to perfectly insure themselves
against adverse price changes in period 2. In this case, trading volume is not sensitive to any
characteristics of the economy, and in particular those of the anticipated public signals, N and
s. Therefore, the following is a necessary condition for deriving implications for trading volume:
Necessary Condition A positive fraction of investors, 0 < θ ≤ 1, must be subject to an ITD,
τ > 0, in period 1.4
I turn now to a discussion of these results and the empirical implications drawn from them.
2.4 Empirical Implications
This section describes the main empirical implications of the model that I test in Section 4.
First, recall from (2.21) in Proposition 1 that per-capita trading volume following an earnings
announcement is given by:
V1 = V ∗ − (1− θ)
ITD incentive to
postpone trade︷ ︸︸ ︷
θτ∆¯P1
1
γV ar
[
P˜2
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk incentive to
trade immediately
.
4In other words, taxes matter to some investors!
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This illustrates that per-capita trading volume following an earnings announcement is decreas-
ing in the aggregate ITD incentive to postpone trading, θτ∆¯P1, holding the variance of future
price constant (see Corollary 1). Note that the ITD incentive depends upon the average price
appreciation of the stock held by the sellers, ∆¯P1, capturing the importance of considering
aggregate incentives among all investors in determining the effects of ITDs on trading volume.
Investors purchase shares at different times and with different tax bases, so that at a given point
in time investors face different ITD tax incentives reflecting differences in asset appreciation.
Referring again to equation (2.21) in Proposition 1, we see that per-capita trading volume is
increasing in the variance of future price, V ar[P˜2], holding the ITD incentive, θτ∆¯P1, constant.
In deciding whether to postpone trade in order to minimize taxes, investors must also consider
the cost of being undiversified until they qualify for the lower tax rate. As (2.21) shows, ceteris
paribus, traders are more likely to trade early (i.e., period 1 trading volume increases) as the
cost of being undiversified, captured by the variance of future price, increases. I disaggregate
the total risk faced by investors into the duration (N in the model) and the intensity (s in
the model) of risk.5 Intuitively, duration captures the amount of time that the risk must be
held until qualification for the lower rate, while intensity captures the risk of adverse price
movement per unit of time. Both effects, based on the cross-partial derivatives of Corollary 2,
lead to the two main empirical implications of the model. The first empirical implication relates
the duration component of risk and is stated as follows:
Empirical Implication 1. The negative impact of ITD costs on trading volume around earn-
ings announcements is mitigated (i.e., is less negative) as the time to qualification increases
(i.e., duration increases).
As the time to qualification increases, an investor must remain exposed to the risk of adverse
price movements over a longer period. Therefore, investors optimally trade more shares today
to reduce risk, despite the negative wealth effect of paying the higher short-term tax rate on
trading profits.
5Intensity is captured by signal precision, s, in the model, as high-precision signals will cause the future price
to be very sensitive to these signals, exposing risk-averse traders to the possibility of large price drops.
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Empirical Implication 2. The negative impact of ITD costs on trading volume around earn-
ings announcements is mitigated (i.e., less negative) as the intensity of risk per unit of time
increases.
As the intensity of risk per unit of time increases (captured by the precision of a single
information signal, s, in the interim period), investors are again more willing to trade early,
despite the higher taxes, to insulate themselves against the higher implicit costs associated with
the risk of adverse price changes. Next, I turn to the empirical analysis built around these two
empirical implications.
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Chapter 3
Empirical Sample and Variable Definitions
3.1 Sample Selection
To test the empirical implications of my model, I examine abnormal trading volume around
quarterly earnings announcements. While quarterly earnings announcements are not an in-
herent aspect of my model, such a setting does provide at least two benefits. First, quarterly
earnings announcements provide a large sample setting associated with spikes in trading volume
(e.g., Beaver, 1968; Morse, 1981; Bamber, 1986; Landsman and Maydew, 2002). As a result,
quarterly earnings announcements are likely to satisfy the theoretical criterion of “given that
investors desire to trade.” Such announcements are associated with extensive portfolio rebal-
ancing, and so provide a relatively powerful setting to detect whether risk and ITD incentives
interact to influence trading volume in a manner predicted by my model.
In addition, as described in the theoretical framework, a necessary condition for a relation-
ship to exist between risk and trading volume is that ITD incentives have to influence investors’
trading decisions.1 Consistent with this necessary condition, Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford
(2003) and Hurtt and Seida (2004) document evidence of a negative and significant relationship
between ITDs and trading volume around quarterly earnings announcements. This provides
1Absent any transaction costs, such as an ITD, traders will immediately trade to their optimal risk sharing
portfolio to insulate themselves from future adverse price changes. In other words, investors will trade to the same
portfolio regardless of the risk of future adverse price changes, implying that there is no relationship between
trading volume and risk. A necessary condition for such a relationship is the existence of a market friction, such
as an ITD.
prima facie motivation for examining the role of risk and trading volume around quarterly
earnings announcements given this prior empirical support of the necessary condition.
I begin by collecting data on all firms with an available quarterly earnings announcement
date between 1982 and 2005, as found in Compustat. Next, I eliminate observations with
a quarterly earnings announcement falling on a date when the requisite ITD holding period
is not equal to 12 months.2 Finally, I require that each observation has the necessary data
from Compustat, CRSP, I/B/E/S, and Thomson Financial to compute all variables used in
the empirical analysis. The final sample contains 67, 493 quarterly earnings announcement
observations, representing 5, 903 unique firms.
3.2 Variable Definitions
The empirical implications developed in Section 2 rely upon three important measures: (1)
trading volume (the outcome or dependent variable), (2) the ITD incentive to postpone trading,
and (3) the risk incentive to trade immediately. The following describes the empirical proxies for
each of the three key measures as well as other control variables used in the empirical analysis.
First, the dependent variable employed in multivariate tests is the cumulative, three–day
abnormal trading volume, AVOL, around quarterly earnings announcements. Following Ajinkya
and Jain (1989), daily abnormal trading volume is estimated as the residual from the following
“market” model regression for volume:
Vj,t−k = A+B · Vm,t−k + ej,t−k, (3.1)
where Vj,t−k =
ln(1.0 + dollar value of firm j ’s shares traded on day t-k)
ln(1.0 + market value of firm j ’s shares outstanding on day t-k)
,
Vm,t−k =
ln(1.0 + dollar value of shares of all stocks traded on day t-k)
ln(1.0 + market value of shares outstanding of all stocks on day t-k)
,
ej,t−k = abnormal trading volume for stock j on day t-k .
2This filter excludes announcements made from June 23, 1985 through July 1, 1988 (6-month holding period)
and between July 29, 1997 and December 31, 1997 (18-month holding period).
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For each firm j and quarterly earnings announcement date t, coefficients A and B are estimated
using daily volume observations from the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1
(after excluding three–day windows around prior quarterly earnings announcement dates). As
prescribed by Ajinkya and Jain (1989), (3.1) is estimated using Estimated Generalized Least
Squares (EGLS) with an AR(1) structure imposed upon the residuals to account for potential
autocorrelation.3 The three–day abnormal trading volume, AVOL, is defined as 100 times the
cumulative daily prediction errors from (3.1), estimated for days t− 1 to t+ 1 surrounding the
earnings announcement date.
Second, I construct an empirical proxy for the total ITD incentive, ITD, aggregated across
all investors at the earnings announcement. Recall from the theoretical framework that an
individual investor’s ITD incentive to postpone trading is a product of the difference between the
short-term and long-term capital gains tax rates, ∆RATE , and the change in stock price, ∆Pn,
from the time the shares were acquired to the date of the earnings announcement. Following
prior ITD studies, I define ∆RATE as the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax
rate less the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t.
The change in stock price at the announcement date is defined as the logarithm of the closing
stock price on day t− 2, ln (Pt−2), minus the logarithm of the initial purchase price (adjusted
for stock splits and stock dividends) on day t− n, ln (Pt−n), where n is the number of trading
days prior to the earnings announcement on which the asset was purchased. As my model
clearly demonstrates, trading volume should reflect the aggregate ITD incentive and, therefore,
the aggregate price change among all investors on day t. Before aggregating price changes, it
is important to note that a change in price with respect to a given day in the past may not
induce a strong ITD effect on abnormal trading volume around the earnings announcement if
relatively few shares were traded on that particular day. In other words, if very few shares
3Autocorrelations in trading volume could arise when all the traders do not trade within one day based on
information they use to rebalance their portfolios. Using theoretical models developed by Karpoff (1986) and
Huffman (1987) as motivation, Ajinkya and Jain (1989) empirically document significant autocorrelation in both
raw and abnormal daily trading volume. The EGLS model takes this autocorrelation structure in the residuals
into account. The first step in the EGLS regression is to estimate OLS residuals. Autocorrelations are estimated
from the OLS residuals and then incorporated into a second stage regression to obtain more efficient parameter
estimates (Judge et al., 1985; Kennedy, 2003). The mean OLS residual autocorrelation (untabulated) in my
sample is 0.173.
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transacted on day t−n, then there is a low probability that an investor, trading at the earnings
announcement date, purchased shares at t−n. The price change computed for this day should
receive a lower weight than a trading day with high volume when constructing an aggregate
price change measure.4 Therefore, I compute a volume-weighted, average price change ∆¯P over
the 248 trading days (i.e., within the requisite holding period, n ∈ [3, 4, . . . , 250]) immediately
preceding t− 1 as follows,
∆¯P =
250∑
n=3
∆Pn =
1
248
250∑
n=3
[
dVOLt−n∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m
]
[ln (Pt−2)− ln (Pt−n)] ,
where ∆Pn is the daily volume-weighted change in price from t−n to t−2, dVOLt−n is the raw
(not abnormal) daily trading volume on day t−n, and∑500m=3 dVOLt−m is the firm’s cumulative
trading volume over the two years immediately preceding the earnings announcement. Weight-
ing the daily trading volume with respect to the two–year trading volume means that the sum
of the daily weight applied to days t − 250 to t − 3 will be less than one. This is intended to
capture the fraction of traders that have already held shares for more than one year and are no
longer subject to an ITD.5 The aggregate ITD incentive to postpone trading, ITD, is estimated
as the product of ∆RATE and ∆¯P .
Third, I consider empirical proxies for the total amount of risk each investor considers. The
total risk is an increasing function of both the intensity and the duration of the anticipated
price volatility. The duration component represents the amount of time over which a given risk
intensity must be held. It is defined as the number of trading days an investor, who purchased
shares on day t − n, has remaining until qualification for the lower tax rate. Specifically,
4The volume traded on a past date will not necessarily be held up to or traded on the earnings announcement
date. This makes past daily volumes a noisy proxy for the cross-section of investors trading around the earnings
announcement.
5For example, consider an earnings announcement observation where the firm’s total trading volume over
the prior 24 months is 400,000 shares. If only 100,000 shares were traded in the most recent 12 months, then
the estimate of ∆¯P for this observation receives a total weight of 1/4 (or 100, 000/400, 000). This assumes that
25% of investors trading at the earnings announcement date are potentially subject to an ITD at the earnings
announcement. Conversely, if 300,000 of the 400,000 shares were traded in the most recent 12– month period,
then the estimate of ∆¯P for this observation receives a total weight of 3/4, or three times the weight of the
other observation. Inferences do not change when cumulative three–year and five–year trading volume are used
instead.
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duration, d, is equal to 250 − n and is expressed in number of trading days.6 Consequently,
within a single observation, d will vary among investors depending on the number of trading
days, n, prior to the announcement date that each investor purchased shares. The intensity
component represents the risk of adverse price changes per unit of time (e.g., per trading day).
Guided by the predictions of my model, I define INTENSITY as the variance of firm-specific
daily stock returns in excess of the risk-free rate estimated over the 100 trading days immediately
preceding day t− 1.7
In addition, I also control for the influence of several factors that prior empirical research
has found to be associated with abnormal trading volume around quarterly earnings announce-
ments. The absolute value of unexpected earnings, AUE, is intended to control for the infor-
mation made available at the earnings announcement (Bamber, 1987). AUE is equal to the
absolute value of actual quarterly earnings per share announced on day t, minus the median
analyst forecasts reported by IBES over the 60 trading days prior to day t − 1, scaled by the
stock price per share at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding the announcement. In addition,
I include the square of unexpected earnings, NONLINEAR, to capture any nonlinearities (e.g.,
Freeman and Tse, 1992; Hurtt and Seida, 2004).
I also consider a number of factors related to the availability of preannouncement infor-
mation and prior information disclosure. Firm size, SIZE, is the logarithm of market value of
equity measured at the fiscal quarter-end preceding day t and is a proxy for the level of prior in-
formation disclosure (Bamber, 1986; Bamber, 1987; Atiase and Bamber, 1994). LPRIOR DISP
is a proxy for the dispersion of investors’ beliefs and pre-disclosure information asymmetry
prior to the earnings announcement (Atiase and Bamber, 1994; Bamber, Barron and Sto-
ber, 1997). Following Bamber, Barron and Stober (1997), I define LPRIOR DISP the logarithm
of 0.00001 + the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts issued within 60 days prior to day
6This definition is a direct result of constraining my sample to time periods with a one-year (or approximately
250 trading days) ITD requisite holding period. For example, an investor that purchased shares 100 trading days
before the earnings announcement date will have exactly 150 trading days remaining in their ITD requisite
holding period (i.e., 250− 100 = 150).
7In Section 4.4, I also consider a number of other proxies for the intensity component of risk, such as idiosyn-
cratic and systematic return volatilities, as well as the skewness of the daily return distribution.
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t − 1, scaled by the stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t.8 NUM EST
is the logarithm of the number of analysts issuing a quarterly earnings forecast within 60 days
prior to day t− 1, and is a proxy for the rate of information flow (Hong, Lim and Stein, 2000).
I include a proxy for the bid-ask spread at the earnings announcement date. The bid-ask
spread represents another important transaction cost to investors that may influence investors’
decisions to trade. Atkins and Dyl (1997) provide empirical evidence that annual trading
volume is decreasing in the magnitude of the bid-ask spread. Following Atkins and Dyl (1997),
I compute the average bid-ask spread, BID ASK, for each observation as follows:
BID ASK =
1
10
11∑
n=2
ASK j,t−n − BIDj,t−n
(ASK j,t−n + BIDj,t−n) /2
,
where BIDj,t−n and ASK j,t−n are the closing bid and ask prices for firm j on day t−n. Finally,
I control for potential differences in stock exhange listings by including an indicator variable,
NASDAQ, that is equal to one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ exchange and is equal to
zero otherwise.
8A small constant of 0.00001 is added to avoid log transforming values that are close to or equal to zero.
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Chapter 4
Empirical Analysis
The purpose of this section is to test the empirical implications of my model analyzed
in section 2. Section 4.1 presents univariate statistics for selected regression variables. In
section 4.2, I empirically examine the model’s necessary condition by testing whether ITDs
significantly influence trading decisions around quarterly earnings announcements. Next, I
present the fundamental empirical contributions of the paper by decomposing the risk of future
adverse price changes into two components: the duration and the intensity of the risk. In
section 4.3, I test whether duration (i.e., the length of time that a risk must be borne before an
investor meets the ITD holding period requirement) affects trading volume around quarterly
the earnings announcements. Finally, in section 4.4, I investigate how the intensity of risk
interacts with ITD incentives to influence trading volume.
4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 presents the sample distribution of selected regression variables. Abnormal trading
volume around quarterly earnings announcements, AVOL, has a mean and standard deviation
of 1.849 and 3.114, respectively, which are comparable to the values reported in Blouin, Raedy
and Shackelford (2003). The mean ∆RATE is 0.161 and exhibits considerable variation over
the sample period. The mean (median) market value of equity is $3.019 ($0.726) billion and
the mean (median) number of analysts following each firm is 6.836 (5).
Table 4.2 presents Pearson and Spearman correlation statistics for selected variables used
in multivariate tests. Of particular interest is the Pearson (Spearman) correlation of 0.013
(0.028) between AVOL and ITD, which is not consistent with investors postponing trades as
the ITD cost increases. However, this positive correlation is misleading as it does not control for
other factors that influence trading volume. In particular, it fails to account for ∆RATE and
∆¯P , which represent the main effects associated with ITD. In contrast, the Pearson (Spearman)
correlation of −0.042 (−0.062) between AVOL and ∆RATE is consistent with investors trading
less at the earnings announcement date when the incremental ITD rate is higher.
4.2 Testing the Necessary Condition: Do ITDs Influence Trad-
ing Volume?
The purpose of this section is to empirically test the necessary condition established in the
theoretical framework of Section 2. Recall that the necessary condition states that ITDs must
significantly influence investors’ trading decisions for risk to affect trading volume. As discussed
earlier, Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) and Hurtt and Seida (2004) document empiri-
cal evidence consistent with the necessary condition around quarterly earnings announcement
dates, providing preliminary support for the necessary condition and serving as a benchmark
for my tests. I test for the necessary condition using my sample and empirical proxy for the
ITD incentive to postpone trading and find supporting evidence that compliments the results
of prior studies. Testing the necessary condition is intended to provide a foundation, and serve
as a point of departure, for examining the main empirical implications of my model: how risk
influences investors’ trading decisions around quarterly earnings announcements in given ITD
incentives to postpone trade.
To test the necessary condition, I employ the following OLS regression model:
AVOL = β0 + β1∆RATE + β2∆¯P + β3ITD + controls + ², (4.1)
where a negative sign associated with β3 is consistent with the necessary condition. Table 4.3,
Column 1 presents the results from this analysis on the entire sample. Consistent with satisfying
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the necessary condition, I find that β3 is negative and statistically significant.1 This result
compliments similar evidence documented by Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) and Hurtt
and Seida (2004), and provides preliminary evidence that the necessary condition is satisfied in
my sample.
Is this result attributable to ITD effects? Recall that investors are only taxed on realized
trading profits (i.e., only if an asset has appreciated in value), but do not receive a direct ITD
benefit (in the form of a tax subsidy) from the sale of assets that have depreciated.2 Therefore,
investors’ trading decisions when the asset has depreciated in value should be much less sensitive
to ITD costs (i.e., the necessary condition may not be satisfied) compared to an asset that has
appreciated in value and will generate an ITD tax. The asymmetric nature of tax incentives for
appreciated versus depreciated assets provides a discriminating prediction capable of providing
additional evidence attributable to an ITD effect. Specifically, I expect AVOL to exhibit a
negative association with ITD when the aggregate price change over the prior holding period
is greater than zero. Conversely, I expect to find no such relationship among stocks that have
not appreciated over the holding period. Following Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003), I
separate the sample into appreciated (i.e., ∆¯P > 0) and depreciated (i.e., ∆¯P > 0) observations
and estimate equation (4.1) for each sample. If the results in Column 1 are attributable to ITD
incentives to postpone trading, then I expect to find a negative sign on β3 for the appreciated
sample and an insignificant β3 coefficient for the depreciated sample. Table 4.3, Columns 2 and
3 present results for the appreciated and depreciated samples, respectively. Consistent with a
tax-related explanation, I find that β3 for the appreciated sample is negative and significant
(Column 2), while β3 for the depreciated sample is slightly positive and statistically insignificant
(Column 3).3
The empirical results of this section provide evidence that investors’ trading decisions around
quarterly earnings announcements are sensitive to ITD incentives to postpone trade. The results
1Standard errors for all specifications account for clustering at the firm level (see Peterson, 2008).
2As discussed earlier, investors may receive an indirect ITD benefit if they are able to offset a portion of a
realized capital gain in an appreciated asset with a realized capital loss in another asset.
3Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) find similar results using a similar sample partition.
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presented in Table 4.3 provide evidence that that the necessary condition of my model is satisfied
and provides a foundation for testing the model’s two main empirical implications.
4.3 The Impact of the Duration of Risk on Trading Volume
This section tests Empirical Implication 1, which states that as duration (i.e., the amount
of time remaining in the requisite ITD holding period) increases, investors’ trading decisions
become less sensitive to ITD costs. This occurs because an investor who does not trade now
must bear the risk of adverse price changes until the end of the requisite holding period. As
this length of time increases (i.e., the longer the investor must bear such risk), the more willing
they are to incur the ITD cost by prematurely trading to avoid the higher risk of adverse price
changes. I term this effect the “duration of risk.”
The results of the previous section indicate a need to consider the ITD incentives of all
taxable investors. The average ITD measure, used in the prior tests, equally weights each day’s
price appreciation across all holding periods. Thus, the β3 coefficient in (4.1) only measures
the average ITD incentive among investors and is not capable of discriminating among the
different risk-sharing incentives among investors with different amounts of time remaining until
qualification.
To empirically test this prediction, I disaggregate the price change, ∆¯P , and ITD variables
in (4.1) into the 248 individual holding period components and include each as a separate
explanatory variable. In other words, instead of one aggregate ITD variable, I now include 248
ITD variables, one for each day in the requisite holding period. This allows me to estimate a
separate ITD coefficient for investors with a different duration of risk incentives. For example, I
include the price change, and corresponding ITD incentive, over the prior 248 days (day t−250
to t− 2) as a separate explanatory variable, which represents an investor that has exactly one
day remaining in their ITD requisite holding period. Within the same regression model, I
also include the price change and ITD incentive of an investor that purchased shares five days
prior to the earnings announcement and has 245 days remaining in their ITD requisite holding
period. If investors consider the duration of risk when trading, then I expect the ITD incentive
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of the investor with one day remaining, ITD1, to have a more negative coefficient than the ITD
incentive of the investor with 245 days left, ITD245. This follows as investors with a longer
amount of time remaining in their ITD holding period are more willing to incur the higher ITD
costs by prematurely trading in an effort to avoid having to face adverse price risk over a long
duration of time.
To test the duration of risk effect, I estimate the following regression model,
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (d) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(d) · ITDd + controls + ², (4.2)
where ∆Pd = ln (Pt−2)− ln
(
Pt−(250−d)
) ≡ ln (Pt−2)− ln (Pt−n) and ITDd = ∆RATE ·Pd. This
specification suffers from two problems that prevent a reasonable estimation. First, adding
the individual price changes and ITD incentives from the prior year requires the estimation of
approximately 500 additional coefficients, which significantly reduces the degrees of freedom.
Second, many of the holding period price changes, ∆Pd, are estimated across overlapping time
periods, which introduces significant multicollinearity problems among the explanatory vari-
ables. For example, the price change of an investor with a duration of one day represents a
cumulative 247-day price change. Similarly, within the same observation, an investor with a
duration of two days has a 246-day price change. Both price changes share 246 daily price
changes, which means they will be highly correlated. When severe multicollinearity exists, it
becomes very difficult to precisely identify the separate effects among the explanatory vari-
ables. As a consequence, coefficient estimates will exhibit large sampling variances (see Judge
et al., 1985). This problem is further compounded by the inclusion of the remaining 246 price
change variables, as well as 248 highly correlated ITDd variables.
To circumvent both of these problems, I employ a MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS) regression
to estimate (4.2). MIDAS regression models, recently developed by Ghysels, Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2006) and Ghysels, Sinko and Valkanov (2007), represent a simple, parsimonious, and
flexible class of regression models that allows the dependent variable to be sampled at a low
frequency (e.g., quarterly earnings announcements) while explanatory variables are sampled at
a high frequency (e.g., daily price changes). MIDAS regressions resolve severe multicollinearity
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problems by restricting the 248 individual coefficient estimates on ∆Pd and ITDd to be a
function of a small-dimensional vector of parameters.4 Restricting the individual coefficients in
this way injects additional information into the regression through the parameterizing function,
which imposes a large number of coefficient constraints.5 This reduces the sampling variability
of coefficient estimates and counteracts increased variability from multicollinearity (see Judge
et al., 1985; Kennedy, 2003).
While a number of potential parametric functions exist that are capable of describing the
coefficient constraints, I restrict both β∆P (d) and βITD(d) to second-order polynomial functions
of duration, d. Specifically, the MIDAS regression estimates (4.2) subject to the following
coefficient restrictions,
β∆P (d) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2,
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2,
where αk and γk are parameters estimated by the MIDAS regression model. The use of a
polynomial function to parameterize the coefficient estimates is ad hoc. However, a polynomial
function has an advantage in that it permits the function to assume opposite signs at different
points in the estimation window. For example, the coefficient on ITDd for an investor with a
duration of one (248) day(s) can have a negative (positive) sign. Conversely, other parametric
forms commonly employed in MIDAS regressions, such as an exponential function (Ghysels,
Santa-Clara and Valkanov, 2005), restrict the coefficient function to have the same sign across
the estimation window.6 Because I have no a priori reason for such a restriction, I select a
polynomial function to allow for more flexibility in the parameter estimation. As suggested
4Restricting the coefficients to a parametric function is similar in spirit to traditional distributed lag models
that use data sampled at the same frequency. See Gonedes (1971), Falk and Miller (1977), and Sougiannis (1994)
for accounting applications of traditional distributed lag models.
5Specifically, the number of coefficient constraints is equal to the number of coefficients estimated minus the
dimension of the parameter space.
6A common application of MIDAS regression models is the estimation of conditional volatility models. Im-
posing the exponential function upon past return observations guarantees that the coefficient estimates are all
positive, which ensures a non-negative estimate of the conditional variance. My results are qualitatively similar
when an exponential function is specified in lieu of a second-order polynomial function.
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by Judge et al. (1985), I select a second-order polynomial because it has the lowest Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) among other models with a polynomial restriction of order one (a
linear restriction) through six.7
While the MIDAS regression mitigates severe multicollinearity problems, it introduces a
heteroscedasticity problem among the individual ∆Pd regressors. As the first row of Table 4.4
illustrates, the sample variance of ∆Pd is increasing in the holding period (or decreasing in
d) over which the price change was computed. In OLS regressions, heteroscedasticity between
explanatory variables is not a concern because the coefficient estimates adjust for such scale dif-
ferences. However, in a MIDAS regression, the coefficient estimates are not capable of rescaling
the individual differences in variance across the MIDAS regressors because they are constrained
to a common parametric function. To alleviate this problem, I scale ∆Pd, and thus ITDd, by
the square root of n−2 (the number of days the price change was computed over).8 The second
row of Table 4.4 illustrates that the sample variances of ∆Pd scaled by the square root of n− 2
across all holding periods are approximately the same. The final MIDAS regression model is
given by,
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (d) · ∆Pd√
n− 2 +
248∑
d=1
βITD(d) · ITDd√
n− 2 + controls + ², (4.3)
subject to β∆P (d) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2, (4.4)
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2. (4.5)
Table 4.5 presents parameter estimates from (4.3). Consistent with my empirical predictions, I
find that γ0 is negative and statistically significant and γ1 is positive and statistically significant.
This implies that the negative relationship between AVOL and ITDd is increasing (or becoming
7AIC, first proposed by Akaike (1974), is a measure of the goodness-of-fit of an estimated statistical model.
It weighs the complexity of an estimated model against how well the model fits the data.
8Scaling the price change by the square root of the number of days in the holding period is motivated by
prior evidence that changes in daily stock prices are independently distributed. To the extent this is true, the
variance of price changes should be an increasing linear function of time between price measurements.
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less negative) as the duration, d, of time investors must bear risk increases. Finally, γ2 is
negative, but not statistically significant, indicating a small degree of concavity in the coefficient
function describing βITD(d). Other control variables have similar signs and magnitudes as those
reported in Table 4.3, Column 1.
Figure 4.1 presents a plot of βITD(d) as a function of the duration of risk, d, and illustrates
how the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to ITD costs changes with duration. Specifi-
cally, the sensitivity of investors’ trading decisions to ITD costs is increasing (or becoming less
negative) in duration. This is consistent with the notion that, all else equal, when investors
face more uncertainty in the future (i.e., have a longer time to wait), postponing trade becomes
more costly from a risk perspective, and thus the ITD incentive to postpone trading becomes
relatively less important than the incentive to trade for risk-sharing purposes.
4.4 The Impact of the Intensity of Risk on Trading Volume
This section tests Empirical Implication 2, which states that as the intensity of price fluctuations
per unit of time increases, investors’ trading decisions become less sensitive to ITD costs.
Holding duration of risk and the ITD incentive to postpone trading constant, stocks with a
higher expected daily return volatility pose more risk of adverse future price changes than do
lower volatility stocks. I term this effect the “intensity of risk.”
To test this prediction, I run the MIDAS regression specified in (4.3), but alter the coefficient
functions, (4.4) and (4.5), as follows:
β∆P (d) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2 + αint · INTENSITY , (4.6)
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2 + γint · INTENSITY , (4.7)
where a positive γint is consistent with Empirical Implication 2 and INTENSITY is expressed
as a sample rank.9
9My model clearly predicts that trading volume is a function of the variance, and not the standard deviation,
of anticipated stock prices. However, this is an artifact of the stylized nature of the model’s assumptions and
there is no reason to believe that investors do not consider the standard deviation instead of the variance. In
order to avoid any non-linear differences between the two measures, I use sample ranks because both the standard
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Table 4.6 presents the parameter estimates from (4.3), subject to (4.6) and (4.7). Consistent
with my empirical predictions, I find the coefficient γint is positive and statistically significant
at the 10% level (t-stat of 1.75), which signifies that the function describing βITD(d) (as in Fig-
ure 4.1) shifts upward as INTENSITY increases. This implies that investors’ trading decisions
become less sensitive to ITD costs as postponing trade becomes more costly from a risk-sharing
perspecitve. Therefore, investors are more likely to pay the higher ITD cost to hedge the risk
of intense price movements, holding duration constant. In addition the coefficients γ0 and γ1
associated with duration are similar to the values reported in Table 4.5. All other control
variables exhibit similar values to those reported in previous specifications.
Recall from the analysis in Section 4.2, that investors have asymmetric ITD incentives
depending on whether the price has appreciated or depreciated over the prior holding period.
The previous MIDAS specifications do not account for such differences in appreciated and
depreciated prices and therefore, differences in ITD incentives to postpone trading. A potential
solution is to partition the sample based on whether the stock has an average appreciation or
an average depreciation over the prior holding period (see Section 4.2 and results in Table 4.3,
Columns 2 and 3). However, even if the average investor holding a stock has an appreciated
basis, some investors within the same stock will have a depreciated basis (as purchase prices vary
over the prior holding period) and therefore, different ITD incentives than an investor with an
appreciated basis. Classifying observations based on the average amount of price appreciation
will destroy the information regarding asymmetric ITD costs across different holding periods
within the same observation. To circumvent this problem, I exploit the flexible nature of
MIDAS regression models by allowing appreciated holding periods to have different polynomial
functions describing β∆P (d) and βITD(d) than depreciated holding periods. Specifically, (4.6)
deviation and variance will have exactly the same rank order. All other measures of INTENSITY I consider in
the section are expressed as a sample rank.
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and (4.7) are adjusted as follows:
β∆P (θ) = APPd ·
(
αA0 + α
A
1 · d+ αA2 · d2 + αAint · INTENSITY
)
+DEPd ·
(
αD0 + α
D
1 · d+ αD2 · d2 + αDint · INTENSITY
)
, (4.8)
βITD(θ) = APPd ·
(
γA0 + γ
A
1 · d+ γA2 · d2 + γAint · INTENSITY
)
+DEPd ·
(
γD0 + γ
D
1 · d+ γD2 · d2 + γDint · INTENSITY
)
, (4.9)
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY ,APPd,DEPd}, APPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the
change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is postive (i.e. ∆Pd > 0), equal to
zero otherwise, and DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price
for an investor with duration, d, is not positive (i.e. ∆Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero otherwise.
If investors have asymmetric ITD incentives with respected to appreciated and depreciated
holding periods, then I expect the previous MIDAS results for βITD(θ) to reflect the influence
of appreciated days (i.e., γAθ coefficients are statistically significant with the correct sign) rather
than the influence of depreciated days (i.e., γDθ coefficients are not statistically significant).
Table 4.7 presents the parameter estimates associated with βITD(θ) from (4.3), subject
to (4.8) and (4.9). Consistent with an asymmetric ITD incentive between appreciated and
depreciated price changes, I find the coefficient estimates associated with appreciated holding
periods (i.e., γAθ ) have the predicted sign and are statistically significant. In particular the
coefficient γAint is now statistically significant at the 1% level (t-stat of 2.69) with a magnitude
similar the value reported in Table 4.6. In contrast, the estimates associated with depreciated
holding periods (i.e., γDθ ) do not consistently have the predicted sign and are all statistically
insignificant at the 10% level.
In addition to variance of the daily stock return distribution, I also consider three other
proxies for the intensity component of risk: (1) the idiosyncratic variance of daily returns, (2)
the systematic (market and 2-digit industry) variance of daily returns, and (3) the coefficient
of skewness of the daily return distribution. First, I examine whether the INTENSITY results
in Tables 6 and 7 are driven by idiosyncratic risk, systematic risk, or both, by decomposing the
total return variance, INTENSITY, into the idiosyncratic variance, IDIO, and the systematic
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variance, SYST. Specifically, IDIO and SYST are equal to the variance of the residual and
predicted values (expressed as a sample rank), respectively, from a regression of firm-specific
returns on the CRSP value-weighted market return and the 2-digit industry return (for example,
see Roll, 1988), estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1, where
t is the quarterly earnings announcement date. Results for this specification are presented in
Table 4.8, Column 1. I find γAidio is positive and statistically significant, while γ
A
syst is slightly
negative and statistically insignificant. These results indicate that if investors attempt to hedge
their risks (e.g., by short selling similar assets), it may be difficult to find a substitute asset to
hedge the idiosyncratic risk of adverse price changes while waiting to ITD holding period to
expire. Conversely, systematic risk does not significantly influence the sensitivity of investors’
trading decisions to ITD costs.
Second, I examine the degree to which a firm’s stock is “crash prone” by examining the
degree of left-skewness in the daily return distribution. Specifically, I define SKEW as the
negative coefficient of skewness (expressed as a sample rank) of the firm-specific daily price
change distribution, estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1.
Following Chen, Hong and Stein (2001), I compute SKEW as follows:
SKEW = − 100 · 99
3/2 ·∑101n=2R3t−n
99 · 98 ·
(∑101
n=2R
2
t−n
)3/2 ,
where Rt−n is the logarithm of the daily change is stock price on day t−n. Placing a minus sign
on the coefficient of skewness adopts the convention that a higher value of SKEW corresponds
to a higher risk of a stock price “crash.” Table 4.8, Column 2 presents results for the MIDAS
specification in which INTENSITY is replaced with SKEW. Consistent with the INTENSITY
results from Table 4.7, I find that γAskew is positive indicating that investors trading decisions
become less sensitive to ITD costs as the probability of large stock price “crash” (i.e. high
SKEW ) increases. However, this coefficient is not statistically significant (t-statistic of 1.52).
Finally, prior research documents a positive correlation between stock price volatility and the
degree of institutional ownership in a firm (e.g., Potter, 1992; Sias, 1996). Many institutions are
exempt from paying capital gains taxes leaving them with no ITD incentive to postpone trading.
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Because INTENSITY is based on the stock price volatility, it may simply serve as a proxy for the
degree of institutional ownership and, therefore, capturing the average tax status among traders
at the quarterly earnings announcement date, rather than the risk of adverse price changes that
investors’ subject to an ITD consider. I examine this possibility by computing the fraction of
a firm’s stock owned by institutional investors to see if it eliminates the statistical significance
or changes the sign of γAidio in Table 4.8, Column 1. Specifically, I include the percentage of
shares held by 13-f filing institutions, INST (expressed as a sample rank), computed at the end
of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the earnings announcement date. The results
in Table 4.8, Column 3 show that γAidio remains negative and statistically significant, while
γAinst is positive and statistically insignificant. The lack of significance associated with γ
A
inst
is consistent with the empirical evidence in Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2003) illustrating
that the degree of institutional ownership does not provide a discriminating ITD result for their
sample. This indicates that INST may be a poor proxy for the true (unobservable) tax-status
of cross-section of traders around the earnings announcement. Consequently, I cannot rule out
the possibility that INTENSITY is simply a proxy for the fraction of investors that are subject
to an ITD cost.
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Table 4.1: Sample Distribution
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1st 25th Median 75th 99th
AVOL 1.849 3.114 −5.494 −0.045 1.669 3.606 9.357
∆RATE 0.161 0.052 0.000 0.116 0.191 0.200 0.300
∆¯P 0.024 0.133 −0.416 −0.040 0.027 0.093 0.414
ITD 0.004 0.023 −0.075 −0.006 0.003 0.014 0.073
INTENSITY 0.090 0.098 0.007 0.028 0.057 0.112 0.562
AUE 0.289 0.378 0.016 0.063 0.144 0.342 2.041
NONLINEAR 0.226 0.625 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.117 4.165
BID ASK 1.221 1.129 0.021 0.321 0.932 1.750 5.373
SIZE 3.019 7.827 0.040 0.286 0.726 2.073 58.196
LPRIOR DISP −6.216 1.228 −9.210 −6.961 −6.187 −5.397 −3.479
NUM EST 6.836 5.606 2.000 3.000 5.000 9.000 26.000
The sample includes 67, 493 observations of quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2005.
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. AVOL is 100
times the actual less expected trading volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, where actual trading volume
is the natural logarithm of 1 + the dollar volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, divided by the logarithm
of 1 + the market value of shares outstanding on days t − 1 to t + 1, and expected trading volume
uses a similar ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients from a regression of the
firm’s actual trading volume on the total market volume for the 100 trading days (after excluding
three–day windows around prior quarterly announcements) immediately preceding day t − 1. ∆RATE
is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-
term capital gains tax rate on day t. ∆¯P is the volume-weighted, average price change over the
prior 248 trading days immediately preceding day t − 2 (within the requisite ITD holding period),
(1/248)
∑250
n=3(dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock
price on day t− 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price
on day t−n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t−n, and
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m is the total trading
volume over the two years immediately preceding day t−2. ITD is equal to the product of ∆RATE and
∆¯P . INTENSITY is 100 times the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock price estimated
over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t− 1. AUE is the 100 times absolute value of the
difference between announced quarterly earnings on day t and the median analyst forecast within the 60
days preceding day t− 1, scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings are
released. NONLINEAR is equal to the square of AUE. BID ASK is 100 times the average percentage
bid-ask spread over the 10 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1. SIZE is the market value of
equity (in billions) at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. LPRIOR DISP is the logarithm of
0.0001 + the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts issued within 60 days prior to day t − 1, scaled
by the stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. NUM EST is the number of analysts
issuing a quarterly earnings forecast within 60 days prior to day t−1. NASDAQ is an indicator variable
equal to one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ exchange on day t and equal to zero otherwise.
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Table 4.2: Correlation Matrix
Variable AVOL ∆RATE ∆¯P ITD INTENSITY AUE SIZE
AVOL −0.042 ∗ 0.118 ∗ 0.013 ∗ 0.089 ∗ 0.050 ∗ −0.120 ∗
∆RATE −0.062 ∗ −0.007 0.021 ∗ 0.021 ∗ −0.018 0.192 ∗
∆¯P 0.116 ∗ 0.034 ∗ 0.079 ∗ −0.186 ∗ −0.181 ∗ 0.156 ∗
ITD 0.028 ∗ 0.109 ∗ 0.199 ∗ −0.028 ∗ 0.022 ∗ 0.010 ∗
INTENSITY 0.129 ∗ −0.021 ∗ −0.110 ∗ −0.027 ∗ 0.142 ∗ −0.238 ∗
AUE 0.064 ∗ −0.061 −0.163 ∗ −0.007 ∗ 0.146 ∗ −0.229 ∗
SIZE −0.120 ∗ 0.143 ∗ 0.155 ∗ 0.028 ∗ −0.317 ∗ −0.237 ∗
Pearson (Spearman) correlations are presented above (below) the diagonal. The sample includes
67, 493 observations of quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2005. Let t denote the
quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. AVOL is 100 times the actual
less expected trading volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, where actual trading volume is the nat-
ural logarithm of 1 + the dollar volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, divided by the logarithm of 1 +
the market value of shares outstanding on days t−1 to t+1, and expected trading volume uses a similar
ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients from a regression of the firm’s actual trading
volume on the total market volume for the 100 trading days (after excluding three–day windows around
prior quarterly announcements) immediately preceding day t − 1. ∆RATE is the maximum statutory
short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t.
∆¯P is the volume-weighted, average price change over the prior 248 trading days immediately preceding
day t− 2 (within the requisite ITD holding period), (1/248)∑250n=3(dVOLt−n/∑500m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n,
where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits and
stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t − n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading
volume on day t − n, and ∑500m=3 dVOLt−m is the total trading volume over the two years immediately
preceding day t − 2. INTENSITY is 100 times the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock
price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1. AUE is the 100 times
absolute value of the difference between announced quarterly earnings on day t and the median ana-
lyst forecast within the 60 days preceding day t − 1, scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal
quarter for which earnings are released. SIZE is the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end
of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. * indicates significance at the 5% level based on two-tailed test.
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Table 4.3: OLS Determinants of Trading Volume at Quarterly Earnings Announcements
Dependent Variable: AVOL
Full Appreciated Depreciated
Sample
(
∆¯P > 0
) (
∆¯P ≤ 0)
Variable Pred. Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
INTERCEPT 2.950 (16.49) 3.114 (12.43) 1.816 (7.34)
∆RATE −1.083 (−3.05) −0.668 (−2.12) 0.250 (1.03)
∆¯Pa 3.115 (8.22) 5.692 (8.49) 1.257 (3.01)
ITDa (–) -3.723 (-4.05) -9.624 (-5.01) 0.957 (0.23)
AUE b 0.610 (11.47) 0.772 (10.51) 0.419 (5.64)
NONLINEARb −0.375 (−2.01) −0.338 (−6.73) −0.307 (−1.27)
BID ASK a −0.138 (−6.25) −0.093 (−3.06) −0.153 (−3.28)
SIZE −0.362 (−15.87) −0.422 (−14.95) −0.226 (−9.17)
LPRIOR DISPa 0.089 (6.44) 0.053 (3.17) 0.159 (4.20)
NUM EST 0.413 (9.87) 0.403 (6.38) 0.412 (8.76)
NASDAQ 0.358 (8.33) 0.371 (4.38) 0.218 (3.53)
Adj. R2 0.067 0.086 0.021
Num. Obs. 67, 493 40, 901 26, 592
a Variable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.; b Variable winsorized at the 99% level.
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. The dependent variable
is the three–day abnormal trading volume, AVOL, around quarterly earnings announcements from 1982
to 2005. Specifically, AVOL is 100 times the actual less expected trading volume on days t − 1 to
t+1, where actual trading volume is the natural logarithm of 1+ the dollar volume on days t− 1 to t+
1, divided by the logarithm of 1 + the market value of shares outstanding on days t − 1 to t + 1, and
expected trading volume uses a similar ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients
from a regression of the firm’s actual trading volume on the total market volume for the 100 trading
days (after excluding three–day windows around prior quarterly announcements) immediately preceding
day t − 1. ∆RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum
statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. ∆¯P is the volume-weighted, average price change
over the prior 248 trading days immediately preceding day t − 2 (within the requisite ITD holding
period), (1/248)
∑250
n=3(dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of
the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the
stock price on day t − n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t − n, and
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m
is the total trading volume over the two years immediately preceding day t − 2. ITD is equal to
the product of ∆RATE and ∆¯P . AUE is the 100 times absolute value of the difference between
announced quarterly earnings on day t and the median analyst forecast within the 60 days preceding
day t − 1, scaled by the share price at the end of the fiscal quarter for which earnings are released.
NONLINEAR is equal to the square of AUE. BID ASK is 100 times the average percentage bid-ask
spread over the 10 trading days immediately preceding day t− 1. SIZE is the logarithm of the market
value of equity at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. LPRIOR DISP is the logarithm of
0.0001+the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts issued within 60 days prior to day t−1, scaled by
the stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter preceding day t. NUM EST is the logarithm of the
number of analysts issuing a quarterly earnings forecast within 60 days prior to day t−1. NASDAQ is an
indicator variable equal to one if the stock is listed on the NASDAQ exchange on day t and equal to zero
otherwise. Coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 4.4: Variance of Price Change Across Different Holding Periods
Number of Days in Holding Period, (n− 2)
Variable 1 50 100 125 150 200 250
Var [∆Pd] 0.091 3.962 8.171 10.134 12.065 16.338 20.224
Var
[
∆Pd√
n−2
]
0.091 0.083 0.083 0.082 0.082 0.083 0.082
This table describes the sample variance of scaled and unscaled price changes across different holding
periods, n− 2, prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date, t. Let n denote the number of days
prior to the quarterly earnings announcement date that an investor, with d days remaining from t in
the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days, purchased shares. ∆Pd is price change over n
trading days immediately preceding day t − 2 and is equal to the logarithm of the stock price on day
t− 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t−n.
The sample includes 67, 493 observations of quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2005.
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Table 4.5: Duration of Risk and Trading Volume
Dependent Variable: AVOL
MIDAS Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t-stat) Other Parameters Coeff. (t-stat)
ITDd γ0 × 10−2 (–) −1.102 (−3.29) INTERCEPT 3.013 (16.42)
γ1 (+) 0.865 (2.73) ∆RATE −0.997 (−2.97)
γ2 × 103 −1.610 (−0.12) AUE b 0.629 (11.49)
NONLINEARb −0.376 (−2.03)
∆Pd α0 × 10−2 1.365 (8.77) BID ASK a −0.143 (−6.19)
α1 1.064 (1.79) SIZE −0.389 (−15.24)
α2 × 103 2.953 (2.65) LPRIOR DISPa 0.093 (6.23)
NUM EST 0.417 (9.69)
NASDAQ 0.318 (7.94)
Adj. R2 = 0.068
a Variable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.; b Variable winsorized at the 99% level.
This table presents parameter estimates from the following MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS) regression
model:
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (d) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(d) · ITDd + controls + ²,
subject to: β∆P (d) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2,
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2,
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. The dependent variable
is the three–day abnormal trading volume, AVOL, around 67, 493 quarterly earnings announcements from
1982 to 2005. Specifically, AVOL is 100 times the actual less expected trading volume on days t− 1 to
t+1, where actual trading volume is the natural logarithm of 1+ the dollar volume on days t− 1 to t+
1, divided by the logarithm of 1 + the market value of shares outstanding on days t − 1 to t + 1, and
expected trading volume uses a similar ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients from
a regression of the firm’s actual trading volume on the total market volume for the 100 trading days
(after excluding three–day windows around prior quarterly announcements) immediately preceding day
t − 1. ∆Pd is the volume-weighted price change over n trading days immediately preceding day t − 2,
(1/248) (dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n/
√
n− 2, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock
price on day t− 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price
on day t − n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t − n,
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m is the total trading
volume over the two years immediately preceding day t− 2, and √n− 2 is a scaling factor to minimize
heteroscedasticity in price changes computed across different holding periods. ITDd is equal to the
product of ∆RATE and ∆Pd, where ∆RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate
minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of
trading days from the quarterly earnings announcement date, t, that an investor, which purchased shares
on day t− n, must hold the stock to meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. Other
controls (defined in Section 3.2) include AUE, NONLINEAR, SIZE, LPRIOR DISP, NUM EST, and
NASDAQ. Coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Figure 4.1: Volume/ITD Sensitivity and Duration of Risk
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This figure plots the βITD(d) coefficient as a function of duration, d. The coefficient βITD(d) is estimated from
the following MIDAS regression:
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (d) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(d) · ITDd + controls + ²,
subject to: β∆P (d) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2,
βITD(d) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2,
Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identified by Compustat. The dependent variable is
the three–day abnormal trading volume, AVOL, around quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2005.
Specifically, AVOL is 100 times the actual less expected trading volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, where actual
trading volume is the natural logarithm of 1+ the dollar volume on days t− 1 to t+1, divided by the logarithm
of 1+ the market value of shares outstanding on days t− 1 to t+1, and expected trading volume uses a similar
ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients from a regression of the firm’s actual trading volume
on the total market volume for the 100 trading days (after excluding three–day windows around prior quarterly
announcements) immediately preceding day t− 1. ∆Pd is the volume-weighted price change over n trading days
immediately preceding day t− 2, (1/248) (dVOLt−n/∑500m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n/√n− 2, where ∆Pt−n is equal to
the logarithm of the stock price on day t− 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm
of the stock price on day t− n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t− n, ∑500m=3 dVOLt−m is the total
trading volume over the two years immediately preceding day t− 2, and √n− 2 is a scaling factor to minimize
heteroscedasticity in price changes computed across different holding periods. ITDd is equal to the product
of ∆RATE and ∆Pd, where ∆RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the
maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from
the quarterly earnings announcement date, t, that an investor, which purchased shares on day t− n, must hold
the stock to meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. Other controls (defined in Section 3.2)
include AUE, NONLINEAR, SIZE, LPRIOR DISP, NUM EST, and NASDAQ.
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Table 4.6: Intensity of Risk and Trading Volume
Dependent Variable: AVOL
MIDAS Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t-stat) Other Parameters Coeff. (t-stat)
ITDd γ0 × 10−2 (–) −1.402 (−3.37) INTERCEPT 2.819 (15.84)
γ1 (+) 0.974 (2.46) ∆RATE −2.654 (−4.39)
γ2 × 103 −2.010 (−0.26) AUE b 0.581 (11.02)
γint × 104 (+) 2.919 (1.75) NONLINEARb −0.341 (−3.49)
BID ASK a −0.208 (−6.98)
∆Pd α0 × 10−2 2.495 (6.95) SIZE −0.214 (−9.76)
α1 0.945 (0.98) LPRIOR DISPa 0.097 (7.09)
α2 × 103 1.654 (3.45) NUM EST 0.347 (6.72)
αint × 104 −1.155 (−7.38) NASDAQ 0.155 (4.15)
INTENSITY × 105 1.717 (11.02)
Adj. R2 = 0.076
a Variable winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.; b Variable winsorized at the 99% level.
This table presents parameter estimates from the following MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS) regression:
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (θ) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(θ) · ITDd + controls + ²,
subject to: β∆P (θ) = α0 + α1 · d+ α2 · d2 + αint · INTENSITY ,
βITD(θ) = γ0 + γ1 · d+ γ2 · d2 + γint · INTENSITY ,
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY }. Let t denote the quarterly earnings announcement date identi-
fied by Compustat. The dependent variable is the three–day abnormal trading volume, AVOL,
around 67, 493 quarterly earnings announcements from 1982 to 2005. Specifically, AVOL is 100
times the actual less expected trading volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, where actual trading vol-
ume is the natural logarithm of 1 + the dollar volume on days t − 1 to t + 1, divided by the loga-
rithm of 1 + the market value of shares outstanding on days t − 1 to t + 1, and expected trading vol-
ume uses a similar ratio for the total market volume adjusted with coefficients from a regression
of the firm’s actual trading volume on the total market volume for the 100 trading days (after ex-
cluding three–day windows around prior quarterly announcements) immediately preceding day t − 1.
∆Pd is the volume-weighted price change over n trading days immediately preceding day t − 2,
(1/248) (dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n/
√
n− 2, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock
price on day t−2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on
day t−n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t−n,
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m is the total trading volume
over the two years immediately preceding day t − 2, and √n− 2 is a scaling factor to minimize het-
eroscedasticity in price changes computed across different holding periods. ITDd is equal to the product
of ∆RATE and ∆Pd, where ∆RATE is the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus
the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading
days from the quarterly earnings announcement date, t, that an investor, which purchased shares on day
t−n, must hold the stock to meet the requisite ITD holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is
the the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock price estimated over the 100 trading days im-
mediately preceding day t−1 expressed as a sample rank (high rank is equivalent to high variance). Other
controls (defined in Section 3.2) include AUE, NONLINEAR, SIZE, LPRIOR DISP, NUM EST, and
NASDAQ. Coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 4.7: Intensity of Risk and Trading Volume for Appreciated and Depreciated Periods
Dependent Variable: AVOL
Selected MIDAS Parameters Pred. Coeff. (t-stat)
ITDd γA0 × 10−2 (–) −2.035 (−7.89)
γA1 (+) 1.423 (3.45)
γA2 × 103 −2.410 (−1.73)
γAint × 104 (+) 3.732 (2.69)
γD0 × 10−2 (–) 2.560 (0.45)
γD1 (+) −0.045 (−0.09)
γD2 × 103 3.289 (1.84)
γDint × 104 (+) 0.561 (1.02)
Adjusted R2 = 0.091
This table presents selected parameter estimates from the following MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS)
regression:
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (θ) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(θ) · ITDd + controls + ²,
subject to: β∆P (θ) = APPd ·
(
αA0 + α
A
1 · d+ αA2 · d2 + αAint · INTENSITY
)
+DEPd ·
(
αD0 + α
D
1 · d+ αD2 · d2 + αDint · INTENSITY
)
,
βITD(θ) = APPd ·
(
γA0 + γ
A
1 · d+ γA2 · d2 + γAint · INTENSITY
)
+DEPd ·
(
γD0 + γ
D
1 · d+ γD2 · d2 + γDint · INTENSITY
)
where θ ∈ {d, INTENSITY ,APPd,DEPd}. The dependent variable is the three–day abnormal trading
volume, AVOL (defined in Section 3.2), around 67, 493 quarterly earnings announcements from 1982
to 2005. ∆Pd is the volume-weighted price change over n trading days immediately preceding day
t − 2, (1/248) (dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n/
√
n− 2, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of
the stock price on day t − 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of
the stock price on day t − n, dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t − n,
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m
is the total trading volume over the two years immediately preceding day t − 2, and √n− 2 is a
scaling factor to minimize heteroscedasticity in price changes computed across different holding peri-
ods. ITDd is equal to the product of ∆RATE and ∆Pd, where ∆RATE is the maximum statutory
short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains tax rate on
day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly earnings announcement date,
t, that an investor, which purchased shares on day t − n, must hold the stock to meet the requi-
site ITD holding period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the the variance of daily changes in
the logarithm of stock price estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1 ex-
pressed as a sample rank (high rank is equivalent to high variance). APPd is an indicator variable
equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is postive (i.e. ∆Pd > 0)
and equal to zero otherwise. DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price
for an investor with duration, d, is not positive (i.e. ∆Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero otherwise. Other
controls (defined in Section 3.2) include AUE, NONLINEAR, SIZE, LPRIOR DISP, NUM EST, and
NASDAQ. Coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Table 4.8: Alternative Measures of Risk and Trading Volume
Dependent Variable: AVOL
(1) (2) (3)
Selected MIDAS Parameters Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat) Coeff. (t-stat)
ITDd γ
A
0 × 10−2 −2.041 (−8.01) −1.904 (−7.71) −2.029 (−7.76)
γA1 1.399 (2.75) 1.041 (2.61) 1.392 (2.59)
γA2 × 103 −1.670 (−1.29) −1.534 (−1.13) −1.830 (−1.43)
γAidio × 104 4.157 (2.24) 3.451 (2.51)
γAsyst × 104 −0.837 (−0.93) −1.435 (−1.07)
γAskew × 104 0.711 (1.52)
γAinst × 104 0.623 (0.21)
This table presents selected parameter estimates from the following MIxed DAta Sampling (MIDAS) regression:
AVOL = β0 +
248∑
d=1
β∆P (θ) ·∆Pd +
248∑
d=1
βITD(θ) · ITDd + controls + ²,
subject to: β∆P (θ) = APPd · (αA0 + αA1 · d+ αA2 · d2 + αAidio · IDIO + αAsyst · SYST
+αAskew · SKEW + αAinst · INST )
+DEPd · (αD0 + αD1 · d+ αD2 · d2 + αDidio · IDIO + αDsyst · SYST
+αDskew · SKEW + αDinst · INST ),
βITD(θ) = APPd · (γA0 + γA1 · d+ γA2 · d2 + γAidio · IDIO + γAsyst · SYST
+γAskew · SKEW + γAinst · INST )
+DEPd · (γD0 + γD1 · d+ γD2 · d2 + γDidio · IDIO + γDsyst · SYST
+γDskew · SKEW + γDinst · INST ),
where θ ∈ {d, IDIO ,SYST ,SKEW , INST ,APPd,DEPd}. The dependent variable is the three–day abnormal
trading volume, AVOL (defined in Section 3.2), around 67, 493 quarterly earnings announcements from 1982
to 2005. ∆Pd is the volume-weighted price change over n trading days immediately preceding day t − 2,
(1/248) (dVOLt−n/
∑500
m=3 dVOLt−m)∆Pt−n/
√
n− 2, where ∆Pt−n is equal to the logarithm of the stock price
on day t− 2 (adjusted for stock splits and stock dividends) minus the logarithm of the stock price on day t− n,
dVOLt−n is the daily trading volume on day t−n,∑500m=3 dVOLt−m is the total trading volume over the two years
immediately preceding day t− 2, and √n− 2 is a scaling factor to minimize heteroscedasticity in price changes
computed across different holding periods. ITDd is equal to the product of ∆RATE and ∆Pd, where ∆RATE is
the maximum statutory short-term capital gains tax rate minus the maximum statutory long-term capital gains
tax rate on day t. Duration, d, is the number of trading days from the quarterly earnings announcement date,
t, that an investor, which purchased shares on day t− n, must hold the stock to meet the requisite ITD holding
period of 250 trading days. INTENSITY is the the variance of daily changes in the logarithm of stock price
estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1 expressed as a sample rank (high rank is
equivalent to high variance). IDIO (SYST ) is the residual (predicted) variance, expressed as a sample rank, from
a regression of firm-specific excess returns on the excess market return and the excess 2-digit industry return
estimated over the 100 trading days immediately preceding day t − 1. SKEW, expressed as a sample rank, is
the negative coefficient of skewness of the firm-specific daily return distribution estimated over the 100 trading
days immediately preceding day t − 1. INST, expressed as a sample rank, is the percentage of shares held by
a 13-f filing institution at the end of the calendar quarter immediately preceding the earnings announcement
date, t. APPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the change in stock price for an investor with duration,
d, is postive (i.e. ∆Pd > 0) and equal to zero otherwise. DEPd is an indicator variable equal to one if the
change in stock price for an investor with duration, d, is not positive (i.e. ∆Pd ≤ 0) and equal to zero other-
wise. Other controls (defined in Section 3.2) include AUE, NONLINEAR, SIZE, LPRIOR DISP, NUM EST,
and NASDAQ. Coefficient t-statistics are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm level.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates how the risk of future adverse price
changes created by the anticipated arrival of information influences risk-averse investors’ trad-
ing decisions in institutionally imperfect capital markets. I examine the relationship between
trading volume and the risk of adverse price changes, as measured by stock price volatility, in
the presence of trading frictions created by the existence of intertemporal tax discontinuities
(ITDs). An ITD refers to the incremental capital gains tax rate applied to trading profits on
shares held for less than a requisite amount of time. Specifically, I examine how trading volume
is influenced by the trade-off between the risk-sharing benefits of immediate trade to mitigate
exposure to future adverse price changes, and explicit transaction costs imposed upon such
trades by the existence of an ITD.
Employing a stylized model, I demonstrate that current trading decisions depend upon two
aspects of risk: the expected intensity of future price fluctuations per unit of time and the
duration of time that risk must be borne. Tension in the model is created by introducing
an incremental capital gains tax rate applied to trading profits on shares held for less than a
requisite amount of time. Thus, risk-averse investors face an economic tension between trading
immediately to an optimal risk-sharing portfolio at the cost of incurring an incremental tax on
realized trading profits, versus postponing trade to avoid the incremental tax while facing the
risk of interim, adverse price changes. Specifically, I find that the total amount of risk that each
investor considers is an increasing function of both the intensity and the duration of the risk of
adverse price changes. Intuitively, intensity captures the risk of adverse price movements per
unit of time, while duration captures the amount of time that such risk must be held. The fact
that investors can reduce tax costs by postponing the sale of shares until a known future point
in time creates a unique opportunity to empirically investigate the impact of the duration of
risk on trading behavior.
I empirically examine whether the duration of risk affects trading volume around quarterly
earnings announcements by employing a MIDAS regression framework. Consistent with the
model’s predictions, I document evidence that as the number of days left to avoid the incre-
mental tax increases (i.e., duration of risk increases), trading volume around quarterly earnings
announcements is less sensitive to the incremental tax on short-term trading profits. Similarly,
as the expected volatility of future stock price increases (i.e., intensity increases), trading vol-
ume is less sensitive to incremental tax costs. These results suggest that investors are more
willing to incur explicit tax costs in order to insulate themselves against increases in the risk of
price fluctuations driven by increases in the duration or intensity of risk. Overall, my analysis
provides a novel and powerful setting in which to directly examine empirical implications of the
adverse risk-sharing effect of anticipated information.
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